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 Robert Kent Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
Thanks very much to Joe Bacchi, Brad Baranowski, Chris Hamilton, and the editors of the 
Boston University Law Review for providing this space for conversation about my book, 
Who’s the Bigot? Thanks, of course, to Professors Sonu Bedi, John Corvino, James Fleming, 
Imer Flores, Melissa Murray, and Douglas NeJaime for engaging with my book manuscript 
and contributing to this symposium. Extra thanks to Imer Flores for hosting the live 
conference at the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, where I was able to benefit from earlier versions of most of these commentaries. 
Thanks also to Justin Dyer, Director of the Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy, 
University of Missouri, for including a book symposium on my manuscript, in which 
Professor Bedi was a commentator, as part of the fifth Annual Shawnee Trail Conference, 
held on March 7-8, 2019. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the joys of writing a book is the chance to have its arguments and 
observations evaluated by creative and engaged readers. I am very grateful that 
the scholars included in this book symposium provided such constructive 
commentary on the manuscript of my book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from 
Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law.1 One of those commentators, 
Professor Imer Flores, also generously hosted a wonderful live conference at 
which I had the chance to hear and engage with early versions of several of these 
commentaries.2 The final book, I hope, reflects improvements that grew out of 
those exchanges. For that reason, one simple format for this response would be 
a series of statements saying “I agree!” or, to paraphrase the old Prego spaghetti 
sauce advertisement, “It’s in there!”3 The commentaries, however, also offer 
some valuable normative prescriptions4 and spark useful questions about 
important future investigations, such as the contested boundaries of public and 
private space (and morality) in controversies over civil rights laws and religious 
liberty,5 the application of the rhetoric of bigotry to past and present gender 
discrimination,6 and the ways a law-and-literature lens might inform and 
complement my study of bigotry.7 This response acknowledges (briefly) my 
basic agreement with these commentaries and then offers preliminary thoughts 
about some areas of future investigation. 
 
1 See generally LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT? LEARNING FROM CONFLICTS OVER 
MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Boston University 
Law Review). Page references to Who’s the Bigot? in this Essay refer to the penultimate 
version of  the book (indicated as “manuscript”). 
2 The conference took place on October 4-5, 2018, at the Instituto de Investigaciones 
Jurídicas at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Professors Corvino, Fleming, 
Murray, and NeJaime participated in that conference. 
3 See Michelle Peddycord-Iasta, Prego & Supplier: “It’s in There!”, ESOURCING F. (Oct. 
28, 2013), http://www.esourcingforum.com/archives/2013/10/28/prego-supplier-data-its-in-
there/ [https://perma.cc/AJH4-V3RS]. 
4 For example, Professor Corvino’s caution about the risks of the rhetoric of bigotry and 
reasons to use it sparingly is valuable. See generally John Corvino, Puzzles About Bigotry: A 
Reply to McClain, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2587 (2019). 
5 The commentaries by Professors Bedi, Fleming, and Murray sound these themes. See 
generally Sonu Bedi, Moral Disapproval and the Meaning, Boundary, and Accommodation 
of Bigotry, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2633 (2019); James E. Fleming, The Unnecessary and 
Unfortunate Focus on “Animus,” “Bare Desire to Harm,” and “Bigotry” in Analyzing 
Opposition to Gay and Lesbian Rights, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2671 (2019); Melissa Murray, The 
Geography of Bigotry, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2611 (2019). 
6 For this issue, see generally Douglas NeJaime, Bigotry in Time: Race, Sexual 
Orientation, and Gender, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2651 (2019). 
7 Imer Flores suggests this through a provocative pairing of my book with Harper Lee’s 
novels in Imer B. Flores, The Rhetoric of Bigotry in Law, Life, and Literature: On Linda 
McClain’s Who’s the Bigot?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2685 (2019). 
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I. JOHN CORVINO 
In Professor John Corvino’s lucid commentary, he views, “through a 
philosophical lens,” the several puzzles about bigotry that I take up in Who’s the 
Bigot?8 Corvino offers conceptual clarity about the messy language of bigotry 
by proposing a working definition: “stubborn and unjustified contempt toward 
groups of people, typically in the context of a larger system of subordination.”9 
By contrast to some definitions, Corvino emphasizes “stubbornness” as a key 
feature of bigotry.10 Corvino then sets out to show how the puzzles I raise 
become “less puzzling” with this understanding in place.11 Reading his essay is 
enough to give one philosophy envy: if only the discourse about bigotry and 
everyday usages of the rhetoric of bigotry were equally clear. “Would that it 
were so simple!”12 
While my book’s project was not to offer a philosophical account of bigotry, 
I find Corvino’s analysis and his emphasis on bigotry as “stubborn” illuminating. 
Particularly interesting are his descriptions of bigotry as a “moral vice,” as well 
as (in some cases) an “epistemic vice,” and “a matter of bad epistemic hygiene 
regarding our fellow humans’ moral worth.”13 With such terms, Corvino focuses 
on the issue of how people arrive at their beliefs and whether they are willing, 
with education and new information, to revise them. I also concur with 
Corvino’s emphasis upon the importance of reasons and whether an underlying 
belief is supported by reasons. Corvino argues that, because it is “generally 
rational for young children to accept what their parents tell them,” a five-year 
old who “accepts white supremacy but who with education will later abandon 
that view is a racist but not a bigot.”14 Corvino adds that, “under normal 
circumstances, any modern adult who accepts that view is bigoted.”15 In my 
chapter on the scientific study of prejudice, I discuss a similar analysis by 
pioneering prejudice scholar Gordon Allport, who explained that children are 
not born bigots but become so through (mis)education by parents and other adult 
figures; further education and social contact on terms of equality with minority 
groups can lead to shame about those earlier beliefs and insight that those earlier 
 
8 Corvino, supra note 4, at 2589. 
9 Id. at 2590. 
10 Id. (citing William M. Ramsey, Bigotry and Religious Belief, 94 PAC. PHIL. Q. 125, 128 
(2013)). 
11 Id. at 2594. 
12 The allusion is to a ridiculous scene in the Coen brothers movie Hail Caesar!, in which 
Ralph Fiennes, portraying a refined British actor, attempts to teach Alden Ehrenreich, 
portraying a rodeo star in a musical-Western, how to utter the line quoted in text in a drawing 
room drama. See HAIL CAESAR! (Universal Pictures 2016), https://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=G629a_3MkkI. 
13 Corvino, supra note 4, at 2593. 
14 Id. at 2597. 
15 Id. 
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beliefs were wrong.16 Allport used the term bigot to refer to students who 
showed inflexibility and a lack of insight about the origin of their beliefs.17 
To return to Corvino’s focus upon the importance of reasons, he argues that 
“bigotry is a refusal to enter the realm of reasons.”18 He offers the “paradigmatic 
case of racists who point to the Bible to justify their belief in segregation,” 
observing that “on the surface . . . they are not bigoted,” because they offer 
reasons for their belief.19 If, Corvino argues, this appeal to the Bible is “not a 
genuine reason but merely a post hoc justification,” then their belief is, in reality, 
“stubborn, unjustified contempt cloaked in a conscience costume.”20 Corvino 
suggests that I “lump[] sincerity and conscience together,” instead of treating 
them as distinct.21 On his view, following one’s conscience concerns “acting 
according to what one believes to be right,” while sincerity means an “absence 
of deceit.”22  
I think this criticism misses my point. In my book, I observe that, in some 
recent controversies in which the rhetoric of bigotry features, such as religious 
objections to same-sex marriage, people treat bigotry as the opposite of either 
sincerity or conscience, so that neither a sincere, religious belief nor a belief 
derived from conscience can be bigoted.23 Though Corvino offers interesting 
hypotheticals about how a person acting on conscience may have a duty to be 
insincere (e.g., misleading an axe-murderer at the door about the whereabouts 
of your family members), my analysis focuses on real-world usage in recent, 
high-profile constitutional litigation: before the U.S. Supreme Court, baker Jack 
Phillips and his many amici described him as a “man of faith,” whose “sincere 
religious belief” and “conscience” would be violated by having to create a 
wedding cake for a same-sex couple.24 He was, they insisted, not a bigot by 
contrast to racists of yesteryear.25 I pointed out that this contrast depends both 
on arguing that racists who opposed desegregation and interracial marriage were 
insincere and used their beliefs as a pretext and arguing that their beliefs were 
clearly wrong and odious, by contrast to Phillips’s reasonable beliefs.26  
I will not repeat my entire analysis here; my point was to illustrate the 
strategies used to distinguish present-day religious objections to civil marriage 
equality from past objections to racial equality. As Corvino and I both agree, a 
problem with the appeal to “reasonableness” in these kinds of arguments 
 
16 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25, 26, 31-32). 
17 Id. (manuscript at 26). 
18 Corvino, supra note 4, at 2595. 
19 Id. at 2596. 
20 Id. at 2596-97. 
21 Id. at 2595. 
22 Id. 
23 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6-7). 
24 Id. (manuscript at 6-7, 195-96). 
25 Id. (manuscript at 195-97). 
26 Id. (manuscript at 129, 197). 
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concerns the temporal dimension of bigotry: understandings of what is 
reasonable change over time. While Phillips’s amici could confidently assert that 
religious racists were “wicked” and could not rely on the Bible or on conscience 
for their beliefs, my book shows the pervasiveness of the theology of segregation 
during the 1950s and 1960s and how opponents and proponents of segregation 
appealed to different parts of the same Bible verse.27 To counter charges of 
bigotry and prejudice, religious defenders of segregation appealed not only to 
the Bible and to their conscience but also to science and reason.28  
 It is interesting to apply Corvino’s analysis of bigotry, with his emphasis on 
bad epistemic hygiene, to a recent news story that seemed a throwback to a racist 
past, when the theology of segregation was prevalent: an owner of a wedding 
venue in Boonseville, Mississippi, informed a couple who had been coordinating 
with the owner about hosting their wedding that she could not let them use her 
hall.29 She had discovered that they were an interracial couple and explained, 
“First of all, we don’t do gay weddings or mixed race [weddings] . . . because of 
our Christian race, I mean, our Christian belief.”30 In a recording of a follow-up 
encounter, when LaKambria Welch, the white bride-to-be, asked the woman, 
“So what in the Bible tells you that[?]” the woman interrupted, saying, “Well, I 
don’t want to argue my faith.”31 What happened next is particularly interesting: 
the hall owner apologized but also explained that she had come to see that “the 
reasoning” behind her turning away the couple was “incorrect.”32 As The 
Washington Post reported, her apology included an attempt to explain how she 
had only recently discovered that the Bible did not support her views on 
interracial marriages: 
She began by writing that “as a child growing up in Mississippi” it was an 
unspoken understanding that people stayed “with your own race.” But then 
on Saturday, when her husband asked her to point to relevant sections of 
the Bible, she couldn’t. After spending hours scouring the text and sitting 
down with her pastor, the owner wrote that she finally concluded that the 
reasoning behind her decision to turn away [the couple] was incorrect. 
“As my bible reads, there are 2 requirements for marriage and race has 
nothing to do with either!” the Facebook post read. “All of my years I had 
 
27 Id. (manuscript at ch. 4). The verse was Acts 17:26: “Of one blood has God made all 
nations for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before 
appointed, and the bounds of their habitation.” Id. (manuscript at 84) (quoting Acts 17:26 
(King James)). 
28 Id. (manuscript at 81-85). 
29 Allyson Chiu, A Mississippi Wedding Venue Rejected an Interracial Couple, Citing 
‘Christian Belief.’ Facing a Backlash, the Owner Apologized, WASH. POST: MORNING MIX 
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‘assumed’ in my mind that I was correct, but have never taken the 
opportunity to research and find whether this was correct or incorrect until 
now.”33 
I offer three observations about this incident (although there are many more I 
could offer, if space permitted). First, on Corvino’s analysis, because this owner 
was willing to examine the basis for her beliefs and recognize that she was wrong 
about what the Bible said and that her “reasoning” was incorrect, she did not 
show the “stubbornness” characteristic of a bigot who systematically discounts 
evidence that “would upset the bigot’s views.”34 While her underlying belief was 
racist, she claimed to be able to recognize the wrongness of her belief and to 
apologize. Second, by contrast to her inability to find Bible verses supporting 
the childhood teaching to stay “with your own race,” ministers and politicians 
several decades ago would have readily and confidently cited numerous biblical 
verses to support their argument that God was the “greatest segregationist,” that 
interracial marriage violated God’s plan, and that segregation was the 
“Christian” way.35 Third, her appeal to her childhood training suggests the 
disturbing persistence of “folkways” teaching, supporting, and practicing racial 
separation, despite official repudiation (at the denominational level) of support 
for segregation and repentance for that support (as I discuss with respect to the 
Southern Baptist Convention).36  
Notably, under Mississippi’s “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from 
Government Discrimination Act,” this wedding venue owner could deny service 
to a same-sex couple on the basis of her “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral 
convictions” that marriage “is or should be recognized as the union of one man 
and one woman.”37 The law does not, however, protect “sincerely held religious 
beliefs or moral convictions”38 that people should stay “with your own race” and 
not intermarry.39 Some commentators, nonetheless, have linked this conscience 
protection law to objections like that of the owner, arguing that it “lays the 
groundwork for people to assert that beliefs alone are enough to validate racial 
discrimination.”40 Some of the contributors to this book symposium express 
similar concerns that it is hard to cabin the scope of religious objections once 
state laws allow them into the marketplace, as I now discuss. 
 
33 Id. 
34 Corvino, supra note 4, at 2591. 
35 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at chs. 4-5). 
36 Id. (manuscript at 86-90, 101). 
37 H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016). 
38 Id. 
39 Chiu, supra note 29. 
40 Id. 
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II. MELISSA MURRAY 
I agree with Murray’s insightful argument about the evolution over time in 
the type of rhetoric used in objecting to opposing civil rights for LGBTQ people 
as well as marriage equality.41 In Chapter Seven of Who’s the Bigot?,42 I attempt 
to provide some sense of that evolution by tracing the trajectory from Bowers v. 
Hardwick43 to Obergefell v. Hodges.44 The Court’s setting limits upon moral 
disapproval as a justification for using both criminal (in Lawrence v. Texas)45 
and civil (in Romer v. Evans)46 law to deny the liberty and equality of LGBTQ 
persons contributed to that shift in argumentation. For example, arguments 
shifted from appeals to collective moral judgments against “homosexuality” and 
in favor of heterosexuality and “traditional marriage,” to appeals to definitional 
arguments (that marriage has always and universally been the union of one man 
and one woman), responsible procreation, gender complementarity, and the 
unforeseen consequences of working a dramatic change to the definition of 
marriage.47 Even as those arguments shifted, however, one constant was the 
insistence that opposition to same-sex marriage or support for drawing 
distinctions between heterosexual and gay citizens did not rest on bigotry or 
animus but on some legitimate reason.48  
I also agree with Murray that in the ongoing legal conflicts over state public 
accommodations laws and access by same-sex couples to wedding goods and 
services, a salient issue is “recasting the public sphere.”49 Murray evocatively 
expresses this in terms of the “geography of bigotry.”50 Murray compellingly 
writes of how “the aggregative effect of religious accommodations is to shrink 
the public sphere—and the domain of state-endorsed laws and norms—and 
expand the private sphere and the authority of private actors who operate outside 
of the State’s reach.”51 She urges caution over this simultaneous shrinking and 
expanding and worries about the risk of instability of the public-private divide 
and of reconfiguring the discursive language.52 She argues that “religious 
accommodations recharacterize the challenged portions of the public sphere as 
private space where dissenting views—and rank bigotry—may be safely 
expressed.”53 
 
41 Murray, supra note 5, at 2617-22. 
42 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at ch. 7). 
43 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
44 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
45 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
46 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
47 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at ch. 7). 
48 Id. (manuscript at 160-61, 164-69, 170-71). 
49 Murray, supra note 5, at 2623-28. 
50 Id. at 2629. 
51 Id. at 2627. 
52 Id. at 2627-28. 
53 Id. at 2616. 
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Murray persuasively argues that there are “high stakes involved in the current 
debate over same-sex marriage and religious accommodations.”54 She cogently 
advises that there are lessons to learn from efforts by white southerners to resist 
mandated integration by “appealing to the private sphere,” both through 
resorting to “restrictive covenants that prevented property from being sold to 
racial minorities” and through the creation of private “‘segregation academies’ 
that provided a segregated alternative to integrated public schools.”55 I agree 
with Murray that it is important to learn from the Civil Rights Movement and 
the significance of the Supreme Court upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
against a variety of constitutional challenges,56 as in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. United States57 and Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.58 As I discuss in 
Chapters Five and Eight, those challenges effectively denied the legitimacy of 
public accommodations laws and their reach, instead appealing to private 
property, involuntary servitude, freedom of association, and freedom of religion 
to justify continuing to segregate in spaces supposedly “open” to the public.59 
The Court upheld the government’s compelling interest in ending discrimination 
in such spaces.60 Notably, and encouragingly, the majority opinion in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission61 cited to 
Piggie Park on the basic legitimacy of public accommodations laws and on the 
general obligation to serve customers notwithstanding sincere philosophical or 
religious objections, including to same-sex marriage.62  
Perhaps the most frequently invoked image in arguments for a robust space 
in the public sphere of the marketplace for religious dissenters is that conjured 
by Justice Alito in his Obergefell dissent. There, Justice Alito warned that 
dissenters from the new “orthodoxy” about marriage may still be able to whisper 
their beliefs in their homes but that if they utter them in public, they will “risk 
being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and 
schools.”63 
While Murray insists upon the importance of learning lessons about the 
attempt to continue race discrimination in public by deeming spaces “private,” 
Justice Alito argued that the majority’s analogies between race and sex 
discrimination in marriage and the exclusion of same-sex couples will invite the 
bigotry label. The recent Arizona Supreme Court opinion in Brush & Nib Studio, 
 
54 Id. at 2631. 
55 Id. at 2625. 
56 Id. at 2630-31. 
57 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
58 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). 
59 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at chs. 5, 8). 
60 Id. (manuscript at 111, 125-27, 189, 203, 206-07). 
61 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
62 Id. at 1727. 
63 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642-43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
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LC v. City of Phoenix64 indicates the continuing power of Alito’s evocative 
image.65 Arizona’s highest court upheld the free speech and free exercise of 
religion claims (brought under Arizona’s Constitution) of the owners of a 
stationery store against a new Phoenix antidiscrimination ordinance, in which 
they asserted that they “hold traditional Christian beliefs about marriage,” 
including that “‘God created two distinct genders in His image,’ and that only a 
man and a woman can be joined in marriage.”66 Therefore, they filed an action 
to enjoin the City of Phoenix from enforcing its antidiscrimination ordinance 
against them and for declaratory relief.67 The court began its lengthy opinion 
with this sentence: “The rights of free speech and free exercise, so precious to 
this nation since its founding, are not limited to soft murmurings behind the 
doors of a person’s home or church, or private conversations with like-minded 
friends and family.”68 Instead, “[t]hese guarantees protect the right of every 
American to express their beliefs in public,” including, in the stationery store’s 
case, “the right to create and sell words, paintings . . . and art that express a 
person’s sincere religious beliefs” and, more critically to the case, the right to 
refuse to create when it is not consistent with those beliefs.69 In this forum, I will 
not offer a full evaluation of the court’s opinion; my point is simply to show the 
emphatic insistence by some that faith must not be relegated to the private 
sphere—behind closed doors—but instead be exercised “in public,” including in 
the market.  
In Who’s the Bigot?, I argue for a framework inspired by Justice Bosson’s 
concurring opinion in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock.70 I contend that such 
a framework fits Justice Kennedy’s admonition in Masterpiece Cakeshop that 
future disputes involving religious objections by merchants to complying with 
public accommodations law “must be resolved with tolerance, without undue 
disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to 
indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”71 In Elane 
Photography, Justice Bosson treated the sincere religious beliefs of the business 
owners respectfully, while also explaining to them that the “price of citizenship” 
in a pluralistic society requires that, while religious people may live out their 
faith in many parts of their lives, once they enter the narrower sphere of the 
marketplace and open their business to the public, they must practice civility and 
tolerance and serve customers.72 Justice Bosson made this case by appealing to 
 
64 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
65 Id. at 895 (echoing, without citing, Justice Alito’s dissent in Obergefell). 
66 Id. at 898. 
67 Id. at 899. 
68 Id. at 895. 
69 Id. (omission in original). 
70 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53. 
71 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 
(2018). 
72 Elane Photography, ¶ 92, 309 P.3d at 79-80. 
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landmark civil rights cases to show the compelling governmental interests at 
stake in antidiscrimination laws and by never labeling the plaintiffs, Elaine and 
John Huguenin, bigots. Justice Bosson also powerfully explained how state 
antidiscrimination laws that have expanded to prohibit discrimination based on 
“sexual orientation” reflect a judgment that “to discriminate in business on the 
basis of sexual orientation is just as intolerable as discrimination directed toward 
race, color, national origin, or religion.”73  
I continue to believe that Justice Bosson’s approach provides a useful way 
forward, but I also know that conservative critics of Elane Photography who 
argue for robust exemptions contend that the “price of citizenship” is too high. 
To use Murray’s framework, those critics claim that the public marketplace must 
have more space carved out for the exercise of religion, even when it has the 
effect of excluding members of the public.  
III. SONU BEDI  
I appreciate Professor Sonu Bedi’s insightful reading of my book through the 
lens of what it teaches about how moral disapproval of racial desegregation and 
of homosexuality took the form of what he calls a “public and private 
morality.”74 I am glad that Bedi finds my book’s use of the idea of a “lagging 
indicator” useful for pointing out how “understanding the meaning of bigotry” 
changes over time, which we can see in the “current moral debate about 
homosexuality.”75 Bedi suggests that, in presenting to readers arguments made 
against landmark civil rights legislation, my book manages to bring to the reader 
arguments against civil rights laws that “now sound like voices from another 
world” and also makes clear that the “debate over desegregation was also a 
debate over the public and private sphere.”76 
As with Professor Murray’s commentary, Bedi raises the question about “the 
boundary of bigotry,” focusing on the ongoing issue of religious objections by 
owners of businesses that are covered by state public accommodations laws.77 
Supporters of merchants like Jack Phillips, who refused to bake a wedding cake 
for a gay couple based on his religious beliefs about marriage, appeal to the right 
to live out one’s faith in the marketplace. As Bedi recounts, I invoke Justice 
Bosson’s concurring opinion in Elane Photography.78 As discussed above in my 
response to Murray, Justice Bosson nowhere describes the Huguenins as 
“bigots” and instead insists that their beliefs demand our respect; however, he 
also appeals to the “price of citizenship” as requiring that they be willing to serve 
customers once they enter the smaller, more focused world of “the marketplace 
 
73 Id. ¶ 89, 309 P.3d at 79. 
74 Bedi, supra note 5, at 2635. 
75 Id. at 2640-41. 
76 Id. at 2647 (quoting Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimmel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 493 (2000)). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2644. 
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of commerce.”79 Without using the rhetoric of bigotry, Bosson, as Bedi 
observes, concludes that “moral disapproval of homosexuality” or, I would add, 
refusing a customer service based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, has 
“no place in the sphere of commerce and the marketplace.”80 Similarly, Bedi 
argues that civil rights statutes, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Supreme 
Court cases affirming such laws, like Piggie Park, “hold that racial bigotry has 
no place in restaurants, movie theaters, businesses, and other such 
nongovernmental spaces.”81 Once again, I would add “acting on racial bigotry 
by denying customers service” to stress that civil rights law focuses on conduct, 
not beliefs or attitudes, even as one effect of such laws may be to change “hearts 
and minds.”82  
I very much look forward to learning from Bedi’s new book, Private 
Racism,83 which will undoubtedly help theorize and make progress on the 
relationship between public and private racism and how conceptions of the 
boundary between public and private may hinder steps to advance equality. 
IV. DOUGLAS NEJAIME 
Professor Douglas NeJaime persuasively argues that Professor Reva Siegel’s 
“insight” about preservation-through-transformation “helps us to make sense of 
the role of bigotry in contemporary struggles over LGBT equality.”84 Indeed, I 
view my project in Who’s the Bigot? as compatible with Siegel’s assertion that 
“[i]f we reconstruct the grounds on which our predecessors justified 
subordinating practices of the past, we may be in a better position to evaluate 
contested practices in the present.”85 I am gratified that NeJaime believes that I 
have succeeded in undertaking that reconstruction and providing “a more clear-
eyed assessment of the role that bigotry plays in struggles over inequality.”86  
I appreciate that NeJaime notices the critical role of time in assessing bigotry 
as well as in assessing what is “reasonable.” I largely agree with his analysis of 
the arguments made in Masterpiece Cakeshop, and the Court’s decision 
illustrates the dynamics of which NeJaime is acutely aware. As he points out, 
“temporality is key to the Court’s reasoning”: because Phillips’s views “are still 
considered reasonable and are widely held,” it “seems wrong to compare his 
views” to religious justifications for slavery and racism, as those views “justified 
 
79 See supra text accompanying notes 70-73. 
80 Bedi, supra note 5, at 2645. 
81 Id. 
82 Some of the supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressed that hope. See 
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 111-12). 
83 See generally SONU BEDI, PRIVATE RACISM (2019). 
84 NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2652. 
85 Id. at 2653 (alteration in original) (quoting Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1113 (1997)). 
86 Id. 
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past practices that have been rightly and universally repudiated.”87 Justice 
Kennedy insists that impartial civil rights commissioners must treat Phillips’s 
views with respect.88 However, as NeJaime further observes, the Court does not 
conclude that such treatment must “translate into a requirement of religious 
exemptions.”89 As I similarly argue in Who’s the Bigot?, it is not necessary for 
a neutral governmental decision-maker to conclude that Phillip is a bigot or that 
his religious beliefs are bigoted to conclude that he is not entitled to an 
exemption.90 The weighty governmental interests furthered by 
antidiscrimination law may justify denying an exemption, and Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, as NeJaime observes, leaves that possibility open.91  
Finally, I am very grateful to NeJaime for identifying a further puzzle about 
bigotry: why people do not use the rhetoric of bigotry more often in discussing 
“past practices of gender subordination.”92 Why do people not use the label 
“bigotry” to address stereotypes about gender roles and about differences 
between men and women?93 To illustrate the point, NeJaime highlights an 
example in my book: the defense of Virginia’s law barring same-sex marriage 
by claiming that centuries of gender-hierarchical marriage law rested on gender 
complementarity and celebrating sex difference.94 NeJaime cogently argues that 
because the Court and much law recognize “‘real differences’ between women 
and men,” we are unlikely to dismiss “all views premised on sex-based 
differences as bigoted” but instead to “leave space for some distinctions between 
women and men.”95  
I touch on this puzzle briefly in the concluding chapter of Who’s the Bigot?, 
focusing particularly on transgender rights and how arguments like “biology, not 
bigotry” feature in opposing more expansive definitions of “gender” for the 
purposes of antidiscrimination law.96 In future work, I plan to do more on this 
puzzle that NeJaime raises about gender and bigotry. For example, are the terms 
“sexism” and “misogyny” sufficient to describe and condemn problems of 
gender-based inequality? Does bigotry—often equated with hostility, contempt, 
or hate—seem inapt to describe what social scientists call “benevolent” sexism, 
defined as stereotypes rooted in paternalistic views about women rather than 
hostility?97 I plan, in future work, to attempt to retrieve the various contexts in 
 
87 Id. at 2664. 
88 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1722 
(2018) (noting lack of respect commissioners showed Phillips’s beliefs). 
89 NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2666. 
90 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 212-14). 
91 NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2667-68. 
92 Id. at 2668. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 2668-69. 
95 Id. at 2669. 
96 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 221-29). 
97 Id. (manuscript at 228) (detailing social science research on forms of sexism). 
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which the rhetoric of bigotry does appear in addressing problems of sex 
inequality, including classic gender discrimination cases. Here I offer a preview 
of such work. 
On October 8, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in cases raising 
the question of whether Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination 
based on “sex” includes sexual orientation discrimination or gender identity 
discrimination.98 It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will resolve these 
cases, but a quick glimpse at whether and how the parties and their amici enlist 
the rhetoric of bigotry indicates some echoes of the patterns of arguments seen 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop.  
One similarity is to warn the Court against a ruling that would brand sincere 
religious believers as bigots. For example, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc. v. EEOC99 concerns whether the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Title 
VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on sex applied to a funeral home 
owner, Thomas Rost, who fired a transgender female employee, Aimee 
Stephens, because she wanted to “present” as a woman at work, including in her 
work clothing.100 The Sixth Circuit concluded that Rost’s religious exercise was 
not substantially burdened by applying Title VII to the funeral home.101 As with 
Jack Phillips, the funeral home and its amici appeal to the burden on their 
“freedom of conscience” and “sincerely-held religious beliefs.”102 For example, 
“because Rost interprets the Bible as teaching that sex is immutable, he believed 
that he ‘would be violating God’s commands’ if a male representative of Harris 
Homes presented himself as a woman [by wearing a skirt-suit] while 
representing the company.”103 Rost’s amici also warn the Court that unless they 
reverse the Sixth Circuit, Justice Alito’s prediction in Obergefell about people 
with traditional beliefs being “labeled as bigots and treated as such” would 
“prove true here.”104 Citing Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell, the 
National Association of Evangelicals argues that 
placing sexual orientation and gender identity on the list of protected 
classes, with no corresponding accommodation for religion, will in the 
minds of millions elevate those classes to the same level of moral 
 
98 Ariane de Vogue, Historic Supreme Court Arguments Tuesday in LGBTQ Workplace 
Rights Dispute, CNN (Oct. 8, 2019, 7:23 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/08/politics 
/supreme-court-lgbtq-arguments/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8FT-ND3W]. 
99 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.). 
100 Id. at 567-69. 
101 Id. at 585-90. 
102 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, 14, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 
1599 (No. 18-107), 2018 WL 3572625, at *10, *14 (quoting EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2016)). 
103 Id. at 5. 
104 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Petitioner at 15, 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 3942899, at *15 
(citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642-43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
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sensitivity as race—rendering those with traditional religious beliefs on 
sexuality and gender morally suspect if not bigots.105 
Another amicus argued that “biology is not bigotry” and that “this Court should 
not conclude otherwise.”106 
In response, Stephens and her amici made sparing use of the rhetoric of 
bigotry. Instead, they argued about prejudice, drawing analogies to other now-
prohibited forms of discrimination to emphasize the importance of learning from 
history. For example, in their amicus brief, law professors William N. Eskridge 
Jr. and Andrew M. Koppelman asserted, “The exclusion of a class of persons 
from otherwise express protection on the basis of prejudice against them at the 
time of enactment does not have an admirable history.”107 Because Rost argued 
that enforcing the dress code was necessary to avoid upsetting his grieving 
customers, another amici countered that “discriminating to appease customer 
prejudices” is a form of discrimination that “this Court has rejected for 
decades.”108 Stephens similarly eschewed the language of bigotry, countering 
Rost’s customer preference argument by enlisting prior Title VII sex 
discrimination cases: “[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the 
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex 
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices 
the [Civil Rights] Act was meant to overcome.”109 The few references to bigotry 
in the amicus briefs filed on Stephens’s behalf referred to transgender employees 
experiencing discriminatory treatment by coworkers, such as being “called 
bigoted names and slurs.”110 
This preliminary look at the rhetoric in some of the briefs indicates that 
Professor NeJaime makes a sound suggestion in urging more engagement with 
the puzzle of how bigotry features in controversies over sexism, gender 
discrimination, and the future of civil rights law. 
 
105 Brief of National Ass’n of Evangelicals et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Employers 
at 24, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 4075083, 
at *24 (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
106 Brief of Ryan T. Anderson as Amicus Curiae in Support of Employers at 4, R.G. & 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 4014071, at *4. 
107 Brief of William N. Eskridge Jr. & Andrew M. Koppelman as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Employees at 17, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 
WL 2915046, at *17. 
108 Brief of Amici Curiae National LGBT Bar Ass’n et al. in Support of Employees at 3, 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 3003456, at *3. 
109 Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens at 41, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 
S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 2745392, at *41 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
110 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Transgender Law Center et al. in Support of 
Respondent Aimee Stephens & Affirmance at 5, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. 
Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 3023275, at *5. 
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V. JAMES FLEMING 
I owe Professor Jim Fleming enormous thanks for the many years of 
constructive and generous engagement as I worked on this project. Beyond his 
specific essay in this book, his contribution is much more extensive, including 
numerous discussions, careful editing, and coauthored work that helped to shape 
Who’s the Bigot?111 Confining myself only to his essay, however, I will simply 
say that I agree with his analysis of how Justice Kennedy, the author of the 
Court’s four “gay rights” opinions, shifted from a jurisprudence of animus, or a 
focus on illicit emotions, to a focus on the social meaning of discriminatory 
practices.112 Indeed, Fleming’s argument about this trajectory shaped my own 
analysis. 
I would point out, however, that the trajectory that Fleming tracks is more like 
an oscillation between the two poles of Kennedy’s jurisprudential frameworks, 
because United States v. Windsor113—which came after Lawrence and which 
Fleming argues shows the shift away from animus—refers to Congress’s 
purposes in enacting DOMA as seeking to disparage and injure. Justice Kennedy 
quotes Romer’s language about “bare congressional desire to harm” in 
explaining why DOMA violates the Constitution’s “guarantee of equality.”114 
Of course, other parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion support Fleming’s 
argument, because (as I observe in Chapter Seven of Who’s the Bigot?) Justice 
Kennedy also “stresses DOMA’s harmful social meaning.”115 Justice Kennedy 
writes about the stigma that DOMA imposes and the social meaning of the 
federal government denying the very dignity that the State of New York sought 
to confer in extending marriage to same-sex couples.116 His famous language 
about the harm and humiliation suffered by same-sex couples’ children also 
looks to the social meaning of discriminatory practices.117 But in any case, 
Fleming and I both agree that Obergefell abandons any talk of animus or bad 
motives, instead explaining the limits of using the law to put the state’s 
“imprimatur” upon beliefs (however sincere) that deny other people liberty.118 
Finally, I agree with Fleming that the turn to the rhetoric of bigotry in the 
 
111 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING ET AL., GAY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016); JAMES 
E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
VIRTUES (2013). 
112 Fleming, supra note 5, at 2673. 
113 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
114 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 174) (quoting Windsor, 570 U.S. 770). 
115 Id. (manuscript at 174-75). 
116 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768 (“[T]he State’s decision to give this class of persons the right 
to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. . . . The Federal 
Government uses this state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and 
disabilities.”). 
117 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 175) (citing Windsor, 570 U.S. at 771). 
118 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
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dissenting opinions stems more from the ongoing cultural war than from a 
careful parsing of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. 
VI. IMER FLORES 
I appreciate Professor Imer Flores’s creative “law and literature” approach in 
his response to my book manuscript. To counter my conclusion that, while the 
rhetoric of bigotry carries risk, it is sometimes “necessary and appropriate,” 
Flores enlists two novels by Harper Lee, the classic To Kill a Mockingbird119 
and the controversial, posthumously published Go Set a Watchman,120 to argue 
that that such rhetoric is neither necessary nor appropriate.121 Putting my book 
into conversation with those two novels, Flores compares the rhetoric of bigotry 
in these various texts to show how this rhetoric—both in fiction and in real life—
stops conversations, “backfires,” and “boomerangs,” rather than advancing 
understanding or the goals of justice.122 
One of the most intriguing features of Flores’s essay is his exposition of how 
Lee’s characters, both in To Kill a Mockingbird and Go Set a Watchman, enlist 
the rhetoric of bigotry and conscience and disagree over how to answer the 
question “Who’s the bigot?” In Who’s the Bigot?, I argue that, in historical and 
more recent political and legal controversies over marriage and civil rights, 
people disagree over who is a bigot and why. They also flip the charges of 
bigotry: as one example, while supporters of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 
1964 called upon the nation’s conscience to enact legislation showing that “our 
spirit is not narrow bigotry,” opponents of that legislation countered that those 
who supported the law were the “real” bigots and, indeed, “anti-bigot bigots.”123 
Flores shows the same dynamic at work in Lee’s fiction, particularly in Go Set 
a Watchman. Because of the iconic status both of To Kill a Mockingbird and of 
country lawyer Atticus Finch as a paragon, many readers have found Go Set a 
Watchman’s portrayal of Finch as a racist extremely disturbing.124 Certainly, 
Finch’s daughter Jean Louise, in Go Set a Watchman, found his racial attitudes 
and behavior deeply troubling. She finds it “disgusting” that he has joined a 
citizens’ council in their home town of Maycomb, Alabama.125  
As Flores recounts, Jean Louise asks her uncle what has turned her father into 
a “n––hater.”126 She resists her uncle’s attempts to explain her father’s behavior; 
 
119 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Harper Collins 2006) (1960) [hereinafter LEE, 
MOCKINGBIRD]. 
120 HARPER LEE, GO SET A WATCHMAN (2015) [hereinafter LEE, WATCHMAN]. 
121 Flores, supra note 7, at 2687 (quoting MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 13-14)). 
122 Id. at 2686-87. 
123 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 103, 124). 
124 I read To Kill a Mockingbird as a required book when I was a public-school student in 
Ohio and have seen the film more than once. I have only read parts of Go Set a Watchman in 
order to understand the context of Professor Flores’s various quotes from the book. 
125 LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 238. 
126 Flores, supra note 7, at 2690 (quoting LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 188). 
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later, her uncle turns to the rhetoric of bigotry but only to say that she is a bigot—
”not a big one, just an ordinary turnip-sized bigot”—while her father is not.127 
How is this possible? When Jean Louise looks up the dictionary definition, she 
reads: “Bigot . . . . Noun. One obstinately or intolerably devoted to his own 
church, party, belief, or opinion.”128 She then demands that her uncle explain 
himself.129 He asserts that Jean Louise is a bigot because she was “rigid” and 
would not “give” when her uncle challenged her opinions of her father, running 
and lashing out rather than listening to his explanation of her father’s attitudes.130  
Flores contrasts the obstinacy that Jean Louise’s uncle attributes to her with 
the advice her father gave her in To Kill a Mockingbird—in effect, about being 
willing to try to understand another person’s perspective. However, instead of 
the usual adage of walking a mile in another’s shoes,131 Atticus uses a more 
provocative image given the time and setting of the book: 
“First of all, . . . if you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you’ll get along a lot 
better with all kind of folks. You never really understand a person until you 
consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin and 
walk around in it.”132 
In effect, Dr. Finch (Uncle Jack) charges Jean Louise with being an “ordinary 
turnip-sized bigot” for failing to heed this advice in judging her own father’s 
transformation into an outright racist.133 
But what would Jean Louise learn if she had taken that perspective? In the 
scene in which her uncle tries to explain her father’s conduct—”Baby . . . all 
over the South your father and men like your father are fighting a sort of 
rearguard, delaying action to preserve a certain kind of philosophy that’s almost 
gone down the drain”—she retorts, “If it’s what I heard yesterday I say good 
riddance.”134 In other words, that “philosophy” should properly be condemned 
and left behind. To call this philosophy bigoted would signal such 
condemnation. And yet her uncle instead uses the label on Jean Louise because 
she takes this “rigid” view of her father’s “philosophy,” unwilling to understand. 
In a later scene, Atticus attempts to explain himself to Jean Louise, 
acknowledging she is “upset by having seen me doing something you think is 
wrong” but stating that he is trying to “make you understand my position.”135  
 
127 LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 266-67. 
128 Id. at 267. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Elsewhere in the novel, Scout recalls this advice, using the shoe image. Atticus uses 
the shoe image when he gives similar advice to an employee (and old friend of Scout) in Go 
Set a Watchman. LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 224. 
132 LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 119, at 33. 
133 LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 267. 
134 Id. at 188. 
135 Id. at 246. 
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Atticus’s “position” seems to be one of racial difference and separation. 
Flores does not view Go Set a Watchman as a proper follow-up to To Kill a 
Mockingbird, but he nonetheless offers an intriguing attempt to read it as a 
chronological, even if improper, sequel by considering the different historical 
settings of the books, from the 1930s to the 1950s. Flores suggests that the twin 
developments of World War II and Brown v. Board of Education136 might 
explain how Atticus, a seemingly “progressive character,” could become less so 
over time.137 Atticus’s sentiments against racial integration resemble white 
opposition, detailed in Who’s the Bigot?, to Brown and, later, to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 because of forced racial “inter-mingling” in schools, churches, and 
other spaces of everyday life, as well as the supposed inevitability of interracial 
marriage.138 Thus, Atticus questions Louise: “Do you want Negroes by the 
carload in our schools and churches and theaters? Do you want them in our 
world?”139 And: “Do you want your children going to a school that’s been 
dragged down to accommodate Negro children?”140 
As Atticus sums up his philosophy, “[S]o far in my experience, white is white 
and black’s black. So far, I’ve not yet heard an argument that has convinced me 
otherwise.”141 By tacking on that, although he is seventy-two, “I’m still open to 
suggestion,”142 is Atticus saved from bigotry because he is not holding his view 
“obstinately” and “rigidly” and would revise his views in light of new evidence? 
Dr. Finch’s application of the rhetoric of bigotry, Flores’s example suggests, 
shows some of the ways that the term is vulnerable to manipulation, so that the 
anti-racist, not the racist, is the real bigot. 
Notably, in Go Set a Watchman, Lee puts criticism of Brown in Jean Louise’s 
mouth, too. Atticus begins by giving his reasons for joining the citizens’ council, 
pointing to “[t]he Federal Government and the NAACP.”143 He then asks her 
about her first reaction to the Brown decision; as Flores quotes, she answers “I 
was furious” because “there they were, tellin’ us what to do again,” “rub[bing] 
out” the Tenth Amendment to “satisfy” another amendment.144 Jean Louise 
makes a speech against judicial interference and the Court “breezily” canceling 
the Tenth Amendment to “meet the real needs of a small portion of the 
population,” rather than bringing about change through “Congress and state 
legislatures like we should.”145 And yet, when Atticus concludes that they are in 
agreement, because they both believe the “very same things,” including that the 
 
136 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
137 Flores, supra note 7, at 2692-93. 
138 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at chs. 4-5). 
139 LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 245-46. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 246. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 238. 
144 Id. at 238-39. 
145 Id. at 239-40. 
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Constitution is “higher” than the Court, she and Atticus are again at odds because 
she endorses the Court’s ruling, even though disapproving of the way it did it.146 
She reasons, “It was put under their noses and they had to do it,” and insists: 
“Atticus, the time has come when we’ve got to do right” and “give ‘em [African 
Americans] a chance.”147 He counters her appeal to giving African Americans 
“the same opportunities anyone else has” by stating that they are free to go 
elsewhere in the country to find what they want.148 
Their disagreement sharpens when Atticus blames the NAACP for stirring up 
trouble and Jean Louise defends it, arguing that the NAACP came into the state 
because of white failures to help blacks and noting that in response to Brown, 
“we didn’t give an inch” or try to help people “live with the decision”: “I think 
we deserve everything we’ve gotten from the NAACP and more.”149  
The conversation degenerates as Jean Louise recounts how, growing up, she 
looked up to Atticus and believed in him and what he taught her about justice 
and right, which did not prepare her for his present beliefs and deeds.150 Arguing 
that he views blacks as “subhuman” and denies them any hope, she compares 
his views to that of Hitler and the “crowd” in Russia.151 After calling him a “nice, 
sweet, old gentleman,” she concludes “I despise you and everything you stand 
for” and states, when he responds that he loves her, “I’m getting out of this place 
fast.”152 She is, in effect, unable to hate the sin, not the sinner, or to separate 
bigoted beliefs and actions from the bigot. Instead, she is “sick of” his “moral 
double-dealing” and vows that she will “never believe a word [he] say[s] to [her] 
again.”153 
Is Lee trying to convey how an educated white man in the Deep South could 
support Massive Resistance? Is Atticus representative of the white “moderate,” 
who perceived himself as caught between the two “extremes” of the Klan and 
the NAACP?154 Notably, Jean Louise resists Atticus’s attack on the NAACP. 
Flores argues that while, in To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus realizes that 
“folkways” may be harder to change than “stateways,” in Go Set A Watchman, 
he exemplifies the recalcitrance of “folkways” resisting efforts to establish new 
“stateways.”155 This recalcitrance spurs Jean Louise to vote with her feet and 
vow to break both her family relationship with Atticus and her relationship to 
the South, and to go to a place so she will never “see” or “hear” of “another 
 
146 Id. at 241. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 246. 
149 Id. at 245. 
150 Id. at 247-50. 
151 Id. at 251-52. 
152 Id. at 252-53. 
153 Id. at 241, 253. 
154 MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 100-01). 
155 Flores, supra note 7, at 2695-96. 
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Finch . . . as long as I live.”156 In effect, Jean Louise views her father and people 
with his racial views as irredeemable, or at least she does not view it as her task 
to stay around and work toward that redemption. In a passage of the book not 
quoted by Flores, Atticus elaborates on the basis for his “position” that “white 
is white and black’s black.”157 When Jean Louise invokes principles like “equal 
rights for all; special privileges for none,” he counters by asking if she has ever 
considered that “you can’t have a set of backward people [‘our Negro 
population’] living among people advanced in one kind of civilization and have 
a social Arcadia.”158 These are part of Atticus’s evident “plain truths”159 about 
how things “are”—i.e., “folkways,” “white ways.” He tells Jean Louise that the 
black people “down here” are “still in their childhood as a people,” although 
they have made “terrific progress in adapting themselves to white ways.”160  
Evidently, the two different portrayals of Atticus in To Kill a Mockingbird 
and Go Set a Watchman reflect Harper Lee’s complex and ambivalent 
relationship with her own father—lawyer and newspaperman A.C. Lee.161 That 
may account for the vehemence and passion with which Jean Louise denounces 
her father in Go Set a Watchman, dramatically charging him with “killing her” 
because of the contrast between her upbringing and his current behavior.162 As 
biographer Joseph Crespino puts it, “A.C. Lee would be an inspiration for his 
daughter’s fiction not because he was ahead of his time . . . but rather because 
he was of his time . . . and of his place, and yet still aspired to worthy ideals and 
noble virtues.”163 A.C. Lee was both a “principled opponent of mob rule” and a 
“racial paternalist” who was strongly critical of any attempt by “outside groups 
or bureaucracies” to judge the South’s morality or mitigate racial bias in 
Alabama.164 In his numerous editorials for the paper he owned and edited, the 
Monroe Journal, he “praised law-enforcement officers who protected black 
prisoners from lynchings” but “opposed a federal anti-lynching law,” because 
(in his words) it “violates the fundamental idea of states rights and is aimed as a 
form of punishment upon the southern people.”165 
 
156 LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 253. 
157 Id. at 246. 
158 Id. at 242. 
159 Id. at 243. 
160 Id. at 245. 
161 See Casey Cep, The Contested Legacy of Atticus Finch, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2018, 
at 68 (quoting letter from Harper Lee to her former Shakespeare professor acknowledging, 
“Yes, Atticus was my father”). See generally JOSEPH CRESPINO, ATTICUS FINCH: THE 
BIOGRAPHY; HARPER LEE, HER FATHER, AND THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN ICON (2018). 
162 LEE, WATCHMAN, supra note 120, at 236-53. 
163 CRESPINO, supra note 161, at 19. 
164 Eric Parker, Atticus Finch: Civil-Rights Hero or Stereotypical Racist?, GOSPEL 
COALITION (July 12, 2019), https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/reviews/atticus-finch-civil-
rights-hero-stereotypical-racist/ [https://perma.cc/468E-YG2P] (discussing Crespino’s book). 
165 Cep, supra note 161, at 68 (quoting A.C. Lee editorial). 
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A.C. Lee and Harper Lee shared a desire that the world have a “better opinion 
of upper-class Southern WASPs than they deserve,” a group described by 
Howell Raines, in a review of Crespino’s book, as “genteel white supremacists”: 
“educated, well-read, well-traveled Alabamans who would never invite George 
Wallace into their homes, but nonetheless watched in silence as he humiliated 
poor Alabama in the eyes of the world.”166 To Kill a Mockingbird would seem 
to serve that goal: while it shows “class bigotry” toward its lower-class white 
villains, Atticus gave Alabama a “civic mythology it could live with.”167 The 
Pulitzer Prize-winning novel and the Oscar-winning film adaptation gave 
Alabama “an internationally accepted statement that we are better than the rest 
of America . . . has been willing to admit.”168 By comparison, Go Set a 
Watchman told a different story about the South that publishers “didn’t want to 
tell”: Atticus Finch is “overtly racist,” “benighted,” and “a gentleman bigot” 
engaged in “stilted exchanges” with his “more enlightened daughter.”169  
Flores also uses Lee’s two novels to examine the challenges in eradicating 
prejudice (including implicit biases—or the bigot in our brains—as well as overt 
or blatant prejudice—or bigotry). He is skeptical that “conscience” alone can do 
the work, even when law embraces “conscience” through antidiscrimination 
laws (“legislating morality,” as I discuss in Chapter Five of Who’s the Bigot?).170 
Countering the premise or faith that “conscience” can indict and eliminate 
“bigotry” and that “stateways can change folkways,” as social scientists and civil 
rights movement activists argued, is the problem that people also appeal to 
“conscience” to defend their prejudices and oppose civil rights laws, as Who’s 
the Bigot? and Go Set a Watchman both show.171  
Lee’s two novels show conscience in both these guises. In To Kill a 
Mockingbird, when Scout (Jean Louise) seems to enlist majority rule as a guide 
to what is right, she tells Atticus that “most folks seem to think they’re right and 
you’re wrong,” to which he responds by appealing to his conscience as beyond 
the reach of majority rule.172 He explains that, while others are “certainly entitled 
to think that [he’s wrong], and they’re entitled to full respect for their 
opinions, . . . before I can live with other folks I’ve got to live with myself. The 
one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s conscience.”173 By 
comparison, “conscience” is more problematic in Go Set a Watchman because 
it seems to be invoked to justify Atticus’s shocking (to Jean Louise) racial views. 
Indeed, Flores quotes Jean Louise’s uncle, Dr. Finch, telling her: “Every man’s 
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island, Jean Louise, every man’s watchman, is his conscience. There is no such 
thing as a collective conscious.”174 As Flores points out, conscience appears not 
just as a bulwark against “the majority” but also, as it is individual, leads to 
pitting one conscience against another.175 The context in which Dr. Finch says 
this to Jean Louise warrants mentioning: he suggests that, until her 
disillusionment with her father, her own conscience had been too bound up with 
her father’s (like a “barnacle”), and she idealized him, confusing him “with God” 
and not seeing his “failings.”176 He asserts that both he and her father realized 
this and wondered what would cause “[her] conscience and his” to part 
company; he tells her that the spur proved to be seeing Atticus “doing something 
that seemed to you to be the very antithesis of his conscience—your 
conscience.”177 Her uncle claims that Atticus permitted her to attack him without 
defending himself because she had to “break” her “icons” and “reduce him to 
the status of a human being.”178 It is during this conversation that Dr. Finch 
charges Jean Louise with being “an ordinary turnip-sized bigot” for running 
from Atticus and the “pretty offensive talk” instead of her (bigoted) “tendency 
not to give anybody elbow room in [her] mind for their ideas, no matter how 
silly” she thinks they are. He urges her to “take time” for such people,179 and the 
book’s ending suggests that she might be willing to stay.  
Flores argues that the best ways to combat prejudice are education and social 
interaction (or what I discuss in Who’s the Bigot? as social contact on terms of 
equality, or intergroup contact). To Kill a Mockingbird offers some positive 
examples, as when Atticus instructs Scout and Jem not to use the “n—word,” 
even though that’s how “everybody at school” speaks.180 Further, Atticus, in this 
more benevolent incarnation, is a moral tutor, explaining to Scout that she must 
“hold her head high” at school and not speak the way others do, and stating that 
the term “n—lover”—a term applied to Atticus for his legal defense of Tom 
Robinson—is a “common, ugly term to label somebody,” a term used by 
“ignorant, trashy people . . . when they think somebody’s favoring Negroes over 
and above themselves.”181 Further, as Flores recounts, elsewhere in the novel 
Atticus embraces the charge of “n—lover,” turning it into a positive trait: “I 
certainly am. I do my best to love everybody.”182 
In Go Set a Watchman, Jean Louise is jarred by the contrast between Atticus’s 
current positions on race and the “color blind” and virtuous way in which she 
was “raised, by a black woman [Calpurnia, the family maid] and a white man 
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[Atticus]” never to “take advantage of anybody” less fortunate than she was “in 
brains, wealth, or social position.”183 Flores relates this child-rearing philosophy 
to the role of social interaction in combating prejudice: encountering others with 
an attitude (invoking Dworkin) of “equal concern and respect.”184 As Flores 
points out, the prescription for fighting implicit bias offered by present-day 
social scientists goes further, urging that people change their lives to encounter 
members of minority groups on a regular basis so they are not “betrayed” by 
“hesitation and discomfort.”185 This affirmative prescription goes further than 
the guidance of not taking advantage. By contrast, in Go Set a Watchman, 
Atticus favors racial separation, invoking images of “busloads” of black people 
descending upon schools, churches, and public spaces. Later in the novel, Dr. 
Finch seems to criticize Jean Louise for being “color blind,” seeing only 
individual differences, and for being unable to “think racially,” even as “race is 
the burning issue of the day.”186 But Dr. Finch seems to have some 
consciousness of how racial prejudice distorts this “issue.” When Jean Louise 
counters that that does not mean that she wants to “run out and marry a Negro 
or something,” her uncle seems to recognize that the issue of interracial marriage 
is “one of the tom-toms the white supremacists beat”; attending racially 
integrated schools does not lead inevitably to intermarriage, but white 
supremacists “wrap” the issue up in “a miasma of sex,” because they know it 
will “strike terror in Southern mothers.”187 Dr. Finch does not approve of these 
tactics, observing, “[T]he white supremacists fear reason, because they know 
cold reason beats them.”188 This is the context in which Dr. Finch makes the 
statement about prejudice quoted by Flores: “Prejudice, a dirty word, and faith, 
a clean one, have something in common: they both begin where reason ends.”189  
Flores concludes his provocative commentary on Lee’s two novels by 
returning to Atticus’s advice to have empathy through perspective-taking 
(“climb into [the other person’s] skin and walk around in it”).190 Flores urges 
that we keep the conversation open and attempt to hear “both sides of the story,” 
even when we dislike the other point of view.191 In this vein, the “radical 
empathy” Atticus teaches Scout and Jem is part of his legacy: “[M]illions of 
Americans credit Harper Lee with teaching them how to understand difference” 
by heeding Atticus’s advice.192 On the other hand, that radical empathy is a 
source of one criticism of To Kill A Mockingbird’s Atticus Finch; he insisted on 
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“the human decency of even overt bigots.”193 Tellingly, a new stage production 
turns that empathy and his belief in the “goodness in everyone, even homicidal 
white supremacists,” into “his fundamental flaw.”194  
In the scenes Flores describes from Go Set a Watchman, Jean Louise does not 
show such empathy toward Atticus, ultimately choosing to separate from him 
and from the South. However, by the end of the novel, Jean Louise seems to 
have had a change of heart and to be more willing to keep the conversation 
going. Her uncle asks her if she would be willing to “come[] home” because 
“there’s room for you down here,” and the town needs her.195 When she says 
that she would not “fit in” and cannot fight everybody, her uncle observes that 
“[y]ou’d be amazed if you knew how many people are on your side,” but “we 
need some more of you.”196 He argues that “the time your friends need you is 
when they’re wrong” and opines that “it takes a certain kind of maturity to live 
in the South these days,” suggesting that Jean Louise might be able to achieve it 
if she remains.197  
In the final chapter, Atticus tells her he is proud of her for holding her ground 
“for what she thinks is right,” including standing up to him.198 After she tells 
him that she thinks that she loves him “very much,” she sees “her old enemy’s 
shoulders relax” and gets into the car with him, “welcom[ing] him silently to the 
human race.” Yet a “stab of discovery” makes her “tremble a little.”199 What is 
that discovery? She seems to have shifted from wanting to “crush” him, 
“stamp[ing] out all the people like him” to “preserve” her world, to viewing 
things more as a matter of balancing—balancing between the “thrust” and 
“drag” of an airplane.200 The reader is left to wonder whether Jean Louise will 
be willing and able to play a transformative role in the life of her father and in 
the town that “needs her.” 
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